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Brigadier General STROM THURMOND

true today even to a greater extent than it was
ITinisClausewitz's
time that "War is an act of force and
to the application of that force there is no limit." How
ever, since the real objective of any war is to impose
our will upan the enemy, is it not sensible to exploit
all means, in addition to the force of arms of which
Clausewitz spoke, in attaining that objective? Armed
conflict-or force-usually will be required in the end
to crush the enemy's resistance; however, the proper
handling of military-civilian relations can also be a
potent weapon in itself. This fact is not generally rec
ognized by the United States and that "weapon" has
not been used to the fullest extent by this country
in the past.
In Clausewitz's day, commanders in the field had
little concern with civilians on the battlefield. Certainly
the examples of Hiroshima and Nagasaki testify that
this is no longer the case. Yet, of all the phenomena
of warfare, that facet which is least understood is the
factor of civilian populations and the tremendous
problems their presence imposes on the commander
in areas of military operations.
Why is this so? How do civilians affect the com
mander's actions in his day"to--day operations? What
is the commander's responsibility? What has been done,
and is being done, at all levels to assist him?
As the scope of warfare broadens with the employBrigadier General Strom Thurmond,
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ment of weapons of increasing destructiveness, the
magnitude of the comma!1der's civil affairs operational
responsibilities becomes correspondingly intensified.
Modern warfare, even if destruction is measured and
is limited to the actual requirements of the hour, will
create tremendous problems. Let us examine some of
the problems which will inescapably confront a com
mander.
Civilians, in numbers greater than ever before, will
suffer personal loss, injury, deprivation and lack of the
barest essentials of life. They will not have the accus
tomed guidance of their former agencies of local govern
ment. Continuing damages may contribute to mass
hysteria, and tend to convert a previously normal pop
ulace into an uncontrollable mob-a multitude of hun
gry, frightened, injured, diseased and disrupted people
who seek only to Hee .further injury with whatever
personal possessions they can carry, and obtain, by any
means possible, whait: is necessary to survive.
How can the problems posed by these civilians ad
versely affect a commander's combat operations? Non
combatants can clutter the roads, and interfere with
or prevent the essential movement of troops and sup
plies. They can compel a diversion of combat troops
to protect lines of communications and supply installa
tions. They can require a similar diversion of troops to
neutralize guerrilla actions fomented by undetected
enemy agents among them. Enemy civilians can spread
contagious diseases among our troops. They can furnish
intelligence to the enemy. More, they can seriously dis
rupt what might otherwise have been a successful oper
ation. Proper measures must be taken to estimate troop
and supply requirements, and plans and preparations
must be made in advance for necessary civil affairs
measures.
Thus we can readily see that a commander's civil
affairs operations are dictated fully as much by military
necessity, as by the customs of war and the principles
of humanity which have always guided our armed
forces.
Now, what must the commander do, and what must

he know, to insure that civilian problems will not pre
vent, or seriously hamper, his military operations? There
is no magic formula, but the task is not an impossible
one. As is true of everything that occurs or may occur
in his unit, the commander must remember that he alone
is responsible for civil affairs operations. This responsi
bility can not be delegated, nor can it be shirked. The
attention his staff displays in this phase of his duties
will be a reflection of his own interest. Therefore, he
must strive to gain an understanding of civil affairs
objectives and techniques, both from a staff and a unit
standpoint, in order to enable him to employ his civil
affairs units with the same skill as he does his combat
arms.
Estimate of civilian situation

The commander's decisions as to his future courses
of action have long been based on estimates of his
own and the enemy's capabilities, the weather, the ter
rain, and so on. Little consideration has been given
to the effect of civilians in his area, or how their sup
port, or lack of it, will influence his operations. Thus
his estimates, in many instances, have not been com
plete. The commander must carefully weigh civil af
fairs factors such as the number of persons in the area,
the status of the local government, health problems,
economic conditions, food supplies, medical stockpiles,
number and condition of hospitals and other public
institutions, religion and social customs of the people.
The estimate which considers these factors should be
weighed as carefully as estimates by his staff. If the
commander doesn't do this, he is not taking maximum
advantage of all the tools available to him.
Not only must the commander's estimate of the
situation reflect civil affairs thinking, the orders he
issues must put this thinking into action. Staffs must
check as diligently to insure that this phase of the
operation is performed as skillfully and with the same
care as any other.
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, is responsible for
all matters pertaining to the local population, govern
ment, economy, and such institutions as schools and
hospitals in areas occupied by United States armed
forces. He must insure ,t hat civil affairs planning is con
stant, continuous, and fully coordinated with all other
planning in order that civil affairs operations may best
contribute to the commander's over-all mission.
As we look ahead to a possible nuclear warfare age,
we see in the combat commander's mission intensified
civil affairs operations derived from the vast numbers
of human beings who will be affected by the extent
and destruction of such a war.
Meeting such conditions demands the development
and employment of the most efficient civil affairs or
ganizations which can be devised. Current civil affairs
doctrine is adaptable to the requirements of the atomic
age battlefield. It is not old; it ha_s emerged since World
War II, and is derived from the lessons of military
history.

As a result, all the civil affairs units are tailor-made
to meet the requirements: first, of the area of the world
in which they may be deployed; second, to support any
size of tactical unit; and third, of any type of transporta
tion, to include airborne operations. These units range
from the area headquarters A and B units, which
normally support a theater headquarters, to the civil
affairs groups at field armies, civil affairs companies at
corps, down to the small civil affairs platoons which
support the Army divisions.
We have dwelt extensively on the functions of the
commander in the civil affairs field. What is being done
for him that he is unable to do for himself?
The civil affairs structure

The Office of the Chief of Civil Affairs has been
established in recent years on a General Staff level at De
partment of the Army under the direct supervision of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations and the
Chief of Staff of the Army. The Chief of CA advises
Department of the Army agencies on, and exercises
staff supervision over, all matters pertaining to relation
ships, derived from implied or explicit intergovern
mental agreements, between the U. S. armed forces
and the government and people of countries in which
our forces are or may be employed. He advises Depart
ment of the Army agencies on the assumption of author
ity in areas occupied by U. S. armed forces; and also
on the planning, training and readiness measures of
our STRAC and USAR units requisite to the Army's
conduct of civil affairs operations.
Presently, for the first time between wars, civil af
fairs units and personnel are being trained. A civil af
fairs group and two civil affairs companies (all an in
tegral part of the STRAC family) are being trained
at Fort Gordon, Georgia; a U . S. Army Civil Affairs
School also is operating at Fort Gordon for training
G5 staff officers and personnel of civil affairs units;
extension courses and material for U SAR Civil Affairs
schools are provided for those reserve officers unable
to attend courses at the Civil Affairs School; a Civil
Affairs branch has been established and is flourishing
in the Army Reserve; civil affairs staff sections and units
are participating in ZI army maneuvers and exercises
on a greater scale than ever before; CA-USAR units
have been activated to meet foreseeable contingencies;
TOE have been provided for G5 staff sections on an
augmentation basis for headquarters of field armies and
below; and, more important, civil affairs doctrine and
functions are being taught officers attending the various
Army service schools.
We are inclined to give more attention to civil affairs
operations in times of a "hot war,'' when our troops
are actively engaged in a foreign land. This should not
necessarily be so.
The increased importance of military participation
in U. S. foreign policy clearly indicates that the solu
tion of political problems cannot be governed by purely

political considerations. The varied methods of Com
munist aggression being employed in the current so
called "cold war," require that the defensive posture
of any country be ready to meet any method by which
this aggression may occur. In many countries, greater
danger now exists from internal subversion of civilian
populations than from external aggression.
Future capabilities

The various foreign military forces, particularly those
with whom we have Military Assistance Advisory
Groups, have a unique capability of combating this
Communist subversion. Therefore, it is becoming vital
ly important for personnel of Military Assistance Ad
visory Groups to become aware of the need to advise
local military forces as to specific means of combating
this Communist approach from within.
A primary objective of our Military Assistance Pro
gram is to save the countries concerned from falling
under Communist domination. This includes not only
building up their military forces, but also strengthening
those nations' political, economic, and social structures.
Most of the major activities of this nature are in the
civil affairs field and will require as advisors officers
trained in civil affairs. This capability is just beginning
to be utilized. There is unlimited room for expansion.
In conclusion, we must not overlook or disregard rhe
future domestic capabilities of civil affairs. We must
not overlook the possibility that an enemy might at
tack the United States. In view of this, we must not

fail to consider the fact that civil affairs combat support
may be required in an area where the local population
is not foreign but American.
In time of disaster, the military services have always
been called upon to provide a reservoir of strength, aid
and comfort for American communities. If this has
been true in lesser calamities, then certainly the armed
forces will be called upon to assist in civil defense
measures in the event of a nuclear, chemical or biologi
cal attack.
Against this contingency, it is vitally important to
our nation's defense to have a civil affairs capability,
alive and working; to have trained, and immediately
available, civil affairs personnel capable of providing the
skills and leadership that such times of crisis demand.
In present-day warfare, the civil population, and the
extent of the damage in areas where the military com
mander will be operating, will require primary consid
eration. Regardless of whether he is operating on our
own soil or in a foreign area, the first consideration will
be survival. This will be true whether it is a city, our
national survival, or the survival even of mankind.
Upon the shoulders of the military commander, upon
his realization of the complexities involved, and upon
his handling of this problem of survival, may well rest
our future as a nation and the future of mankind.
We can only hope that our nation, in a period of rela
tive quiet, is doing what it can to facilitate the accom 
plishment of this awesome mission.

